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Abstract
News reports of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) activities abound in most countries across the
globe yet there is little consensus in the literature as to the effectiveness of the IMF’s work. The purpose
of this study is to provide a systematic review of the IMF literature that identifies the effects of IMF
bailouts from the 1970s to the present. We investigate significant elements and consequences of the IMF’s
bailout policies and implementation approaches such as bailout effectiveness, moral hazard, conditionality,
leadership, governance and the sustainability of IMF policy. Based on our review, we develop the ‘Spiral
of Doom’ framework and argue that the effectiveness of the austerity package attached to bailout funds is
questionable because the design of the package overlooks the recipient country’s unique economic status
and cultural background. We then propose financial engineering solutions as an alternative to IMF bailouts
which it is envisaged may minimize the moral hazard problem associated with bailouts.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of The Society for Policy Modeling. This is an
open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1.  Background
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944 to promote international
economic cooperation and provide its member countries with short-term loans if they experience
a financial crisis or a shortage of liquidity for international trading. In return, bailed-out countries
are required to implement a series of economic reforms in line with IMF policy. Debates about
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the appropriateness of the IMF bailouts continue to thrive. Opponents of IMF bailouts argue that
they make troubled countries further dependent on the IMF (Bandow & Vasquez, 1994; Corsetti,
Guimaraes, & Roubini, 2006), while proponents claim that the liquidity supported by the IMF
is crucial in preventing extreme financial consequences. Yet studies addressing the adoption of
IMF bailouts are largely independent of those that address the effectiveness of the IMF. This lack
of integration within the research could be fueling the inconsistencies in the literature addressing
IMF bailouts.
The purpose of this study is to expand on the current literature by investigating several impor-
tant, yet under-researched, elements related to the IMF’s bailout policies and implementation
approaches, including leadership, governance and the sustainability of IMF policy. For example,
IMF bailout policies typically have a short-term focus. Recipient countries are forced to imple-
ment economic reforms to return their budgets to surplus in a short period of time. However, in
the long term, tough austerity packages may further deteriorate the weak economies of recip-
ient countries. Additionally, IMF bailout policies are overly rigid as they fail to accommodate
a recipient country’s economic status and cultural background as part of the bailout design and
implementation process. In 2012, the Governor of the Malaysian Central Bank, Zeti Akhtar Aziz,
stated that ‘The adjustment, the austerity and consolidation of the fiscal position has to be done
gradually because any drastic prescription or conditionalities would drive the country into a new
phase of economic recession and this would increase the cost to the economy and make recovery
potentially more remote’. In this regard, indebted countries, such as Greece, should be given
more time to implement reforms and clean up their finances; an overly stringent austerity drive
could push such countries into a prolonged recession and make recovery even more unlikely
(Chua, 2012). This is evidenced in Greece’s painful experience over the past few years, which
has resulted in the country defaulting on its 1.6 billion euro debt payment to the IMF, which in
turn will likely lead to its exit from the European Union (EU) zone and possibly even the EU.
Consequently, the European Central Bank (ECB) has expended emergency funding to the Greek
banks as the Greek people withdrew billions from their savings accounts.
In light of the above discussion, our research seeks to address the following research question:
In what way, if any, do IMF bailouts contribute to a country’s financial recovery and stability?
The extant literature is inconclusive as to whether IMF bailouts are effective. This study reviews
the critical issues related to IMF bailouts and offers constructive resolutions for the following four
issues:
Issue 1:  One of the key issues concerns the effectiveness of IMF bailouts and whether they
significantly improve a country’s economic performance and financial stability.
Issue 2:  The IMF is criticized for forcing recipient countries to adopt policy reforms without
considering the difference in economic status, business environment and culture among countries.
The short-term focus of the austerity package may damage the economic development of bailed-
out countries in the long term. In addition, frequent bailout actions can lead to moral hazard.
Issue 3:  Corporate governance plays an important role in economic development and investor
protection. We posit that countries whose leadership adopts sound corporate governance systems
are more likely to recover from an economic crisis and return to economic stability.
Issue 4:  Evidence shows that financially stressed nations are bailing out other financially
stressed nations with borrowed money. The IMF obtains money from various nations that are
themselves drowning in debt. The five largest contributors to the IMF are the United States
(16.75%), Japan (6.23%), Germany (5.81%), France (4.29%), and the UK (4.29%)—all of which,
unfortunately, are in debt. So what happens when the contributor nation runs out of money and
is no longer able to contribute? For how long can this situation continue before the entire system
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collapses? Such concerns add more credence to the argument that new ways and approaches to
fund IMF bailouts are required.
To address the research question and four issues raised above, this study undertook an exami-
nation of research in the areas of management, finance, social science, government and the media
that focused on the IMF’s financial assistance activities between 1970 and 2015. This involved
a review of over 1300 academic studies and reports. Based on the criteria for the selection of
papers examining the effect of the IMF aid programs, and to ensure the integrity of the research
methodology, these papers and reports were reduced to approximately 700 academic studies and
official reports drawn from various governments and the IMF. These documents then, progressed
for inclusion in the second stage, entailing a category theme analysis (Aronson, 1995). Thematic
coding was developed inductively and the studies were categorized by dependent and indepen-
dent variables. The findings generated an understanding of the constructs and their relationships,
which facilitated the development of the study’s framework.
The following sections focus on the effectiveness of IMF bailouts, the moral hazard issues
surrounding IMF bailouts, the effectiveness of the conditionality of the IMF package, the corporate
governance of IMF and debtor countries, and the financial engineering of IMF bailouts. Based
on the existing literature, a bailout model is then developed. The final section provides a short
summary of the research findings and suggestions for future research.
2.  Literature  review
2.1.  The  effectiveness  of  the  IMF  bailout
For decades, the IMF assumed the role of rescuer of financially troubled countries. However, it
does not hold a convincing record of enabling countries to return to financial health and stability
(Johnson & Sweeney, 1997; Bordo & Schwartz, 2000; Corsetti et al., 2006). Evidence suggests
that IMF bailouts might lead to moral hazard, implying that debtor governments tend to have more
aggressive economic policies, leading to a higher chance of receiving an IMF bailout in the future
(Dreher, 2004; Corsetti et al., 2006; Lee & Shin, 2008). IMF programs have three components:
financing packages, structural reforms and macroeconomic policies. These three elements are
inseparable as together they form a single offer of assistance, known as an IMF-supported program.
The effects of an IMF bailout are well documented. However, the empirical evidence is var-
ied and inconsistent. Empirical studies employ different methodologies, use a wide variety of
samples spanning a number of time periods and ask different questions when examining how the
IMF program affects the economic performance of indebted countries. The popular approaches
to assessing the effects of IMF intervention are based on an examination of the economic per-
formance of bailed-out countries before and after the IMF intervention or comparisons between
countries that do and do not receive such assistance (Steinwand & Stone, 2008). Existing studies
cannot provide a conclusive answer as to whether IMF programs influence the economic growth
of indebted countries (Dreher, 2006). Mixed findings are reported in the literature, identifying
positive and negative relationships, as well as no relationship, between the IMF bailout and the
economic performance of bailed-out countries.
For example, in support of the benefits of IMF programs, Reichman and Stillson (1987),
and Conway (1994), assert that the IMF provides significant benefits to a bailed-out country’s
economic output. Based on data drawn from 69 developing countries during the period 1973–1988,
Kahn (1990) reported that IMF programs have short- and long-term positive impacts on the
performance of the current account, the balance of payment, and inflation. This finding is consistent
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with the conclusions presented by Bagci and Perraudin (1997) and Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and
Schadler (2000). Some studies found that the IMF bailout is effective when the debtor country
makes the necessary policy adjustments (Morris & Shin, 2006). Moreover, various researches
identified that the IMF intervention induces short-term creditors to roll over where IMF programs
significantly increase the probability of local currency depreciation (Dreher & Walter, 2010).
In contrast, most studies find that the IMF bailout has a negative effect on the economic
performance of recipient countries. For example, Bordo and Schwartz (2000) analyzed the annual
data from 11 Latin American and 13 Asian countries for the period 1973–1998 and found that
the performance of recipient countries was worse after they received assistance from the IMF.
Analysing data from 98 countries over the period 1970–2000, Dreher (2006) found that the overall
impact of an IMF bailout is negative. Such a negative impact might be due to either the provision
of inappropriate advice by the IMF or the occurrence of moral hazard issue as a result of the IMF
bailout. Drawing on data from 130 countries over the period 1975–1999, Barro and Lee (2005) also
reported that the IMF bailout has a negative impact on the economic growth of bailed-out countries.
In addition, they found that the IMF’s decisions on which countries will be given a loan are highly
politically driven. Loans tend to be larger, and more frequent, if the recipient country: (1) has a
bigger representation among IMF staff; and (2) is more politically and economically connected
to the US and major European countries. More recently, analyzing data from 57 developing and
emerging economies for the period 1975 to 2008, Jorra (2012) argued that an IMF program cannot
improve the economic performance of bailed-out countries. Furthermore, his empirical evidence
shows that IMF bailouts significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults
by approximately 1.5–2%.
However, a few studies identified no significant economic results attributable to IMF bailout
interventions. For example, Donovan (1982) investigated the macroeconomic performance of
countries associated with IMF programs during the period 1971–1980, and found that these
countries experienced a significant balance of payments improvement, yet their economic growth
rates were not significantly improved. Atoyan and Conway (2005) investigated the effectiveness
of IMF programs in 95 developing countries for the period 1993–2002, and identified that IMF
programs do not significantly improve real economic growth in participating countries in the
short term. However, evidence of an improvement in economic growth in these countries was
found in the years following involvement in a program. Similarly, Easterly (2005a,b) failed to
find any remarkable economic growth associated with 56 IMF and World Bank adjustment loans
to Argentina, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana between 1980 and 1999. Evrensel (2002) found that the
macroeconomic situations of recipient countries were worse after involvement in the program,
and that the occurrence of moral hazard might be a major cause of program failure. Zwart (2007)
claims that support from the IMF can be both positive and negative for recipient countries. On the
one hand, financially troubled countries may access liquidity to address their budget problems in
the short term and facilitate market functioning. On the other hand, support is always associated
with conditionalities. In addition, timing is a key variable. When the IMF and investors act
simultaneously, the liquidity effect means that the IMF is consistently successful since the negative
signaling effect of the loan is necessarily absent. Similar findings are observed in many other
studies (Hardoy, 2003; Nsouli, Mourmouras, & Atoian, 2005). Jorra (2012) concludes that debt
crises would become less likely in a world without IMF intervention.
Perhaps the inconsistency in the literature is a key reason for the growing interest among
researchers investigating the effectiveness of international official lending. This also includes the
identification of an appropriate research methodology which to date, remains a significant chal-
lenge for researchers in this area. Dreher (2006) summarized the three popular methodological
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approaches employed in IMF bailout studies. The first approach is to compare the economic per-
formance of bailed-out countries before and after their participation in an IMF program. However,
participating countries are not exogenous, and are usually experiencing crises. Therefore, studies
are more likely to observe negative findings. In the second approach, researchers employ control
countries as external benchmarks to investigate the effectiveness of the IMF program. Ideally,
for each program country there should be a control country with which it shares similar eco-
nomic fundamentals. However, it is difficult to find a perfect match because the economic status
of bailed-out countries normally differs greatly from that of non-recipient countries (Santaella,
1996). Even if the control group were carefully chosen according to economic indicators, the
most important difference could not be accounted for: the decision to negotiate an IMF program
in the first place (Dreher, 2006), which is an endogenous choice. Atoyan and Conway (2005)
suggest that control countries be selected based on the probability of their participation in an IMF
program. However, time is needed to evaluate the suitability of this approach. The third research
approach uses regression analysis to assess the effectiveness of IMF programs, and has been more
widely adopted in recent studies. However, this approach only functions effectively if control for
the endogeneity of IMF lending variables is taken into account.
Steinwand and Stone (2008) argue that sample selection is a fundamental methodological issue
in research addressing IMF bailouts. Previous studies ignore the fact that IMF programs and bailed-
out countries are not randomly selected. Therefore, it is unfair to blame the IMF when bailed-out
countries are vulnerable to financial disaster. In addition, even when IMF programs are ineffective,
it is difficult to identify whether that failure is due to the program design, implementation approach
or the vulnerabilities of bailed-out countries. Jorra (2012) points out that IMF programs might
be detrimental to fiscal solvency if the bailed-out countries are associated with weak economic
fundamentals, implying that we can blame either the IMF or the bailed-out countries for the
failure of international financial rescue efforts. If it is the IMF’s fault, we need to re-examine the
design, conditionality and implementation approach of the IMF rescue package. Otherwise the
responsibility lies with debtor countries, due to their poor economic fundamentals.
2.2.  Moral  hazard
Moral hazard poses another major concern within studies in this field. Generally speaking, the
term ‘moral hazard’ refers to the situation where in the provision of insurance leads to the insurant
taking actions that increase the probability of an adverse outcome (Dreher, 2004). Similarly,
Lee and Shin (2008) explain that a person in this situation has less incentive to maintain the
insured asset properly, which might increase the probability of undesirable results. As a result,
investors and governments treat financial support from international official organizations (such
as the IMF or the World Bank) as a form of insurance against adverse shocks. Lee and Shin
(2008) argue that repeated financial support from the IMF or World Bank encourages investors to
lend excessive amounts to troubled countries with a low interest rate, which does not accurately
reflect the underlying risks associated with those countries. In other words, financial support from
international organizations actually indirectly encourages investors and governments to behave
irresponsibly, which may lead to further future crises.
Moral hazard may be further divided into debtor moral hazard and creditor moral hazard. Debtor
moral hazard, on the one hand, occurs when debtor countries receive IMF-subsidized loans with
interest rates that are much lower than the market rate, which encourages the governments of said
countries to adopt irresponsible policies. Creditor moral hazard, on the other hand, suggests that
the recurring financial support from the IMF or World Bank provides strong incentive to investors
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to behave aggressively in the financial market. However, some studies argue that IMF support does
not generate serious moral hazard because the IMF bailout package is relatively small compared
to the creditors’ investment amount (Mussa, 2004; Jeanne & Zettlemeyer, 2004).
Empirical research investigating moral hazard generates a number of difficulties. First, it is
difficult to quantify moral hazard, because the excessive risk-taking behavior of creditors and
debtors cannot be directly observed and measured. Second, it is difficult to separate the effects of
IMF intervention from those of other macroeconomic factors (Lee & Shin, 2008). For example,
modern financial crisis can easily spread from one country to another, leading to investor panic
or even crisis contagion. As a result, the increased investment risk will offset the reduction of
bond spread of bailed-out countries due to the occurrence of moral hazard. Additionally, IMF
bailout activities encourage investors and debtors to behave more aggressively, which leads to a
radical change in market conditions and country economic fundamentals. In this regard, how to
control for important market conditions and country economic fundamentals in empirical studies
remains a challenge for researchers. In addition, IMF intervention itself is an endogenous factor
that is dependent on the decisions of debtor countries and the IMF, as well as global economic
and political circumstances. As a result, it is understandable that we cannot find many empirical
studies in this field. Researchers normally employ the change in interest rates and bond spread as
a proxy for moral hazard. Therefore, it is logical to assume that IMF intervention will reduce the
potential for default among debtors’ and encourage investors’ irrational lending, and therefore
reduce the borrowing costs of debtors.
Arguably, Zhang (1999) conducted the first empirical study to investigate the moral hazard
associated with IMF programs. His study specifically addressed whether the IMF package trig-
gered moral hazard among investors after the Mexican bailout in 1995. However, the relationship
between the change in bond spread and the bailout dummy variable was insignificant, implying
that the variation of bond spreads was mainly due to the change in international capital market
conditions rather than the IMF bailout. Similarly, Kamin (2004), Noy (2004) and Lane and Phillips
(2000) failed to find significant empirical evidence to support the presence of moral hazard.
Some studies, however, do argue for the occurrence of moral hazard among investors. For
example, the empirical findings of Eichengreen and Mody (2001) support the existence of moral
hazard, and these authors assert that the IMF rescue program significantly reduces debt countries’
bond spreads and increases the probability of bond issuance. Eichengreen and Mody argue that
the IMF program is welcomed by the market, and is viewed as a commitment to reform by debtor
countries. Dell’Ariccia et al., 2002 reported that sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets
increased dramatically in 1999 and 2000 after the IMF decided not to bailout Russia in 1998, citing
the risk of moral hazard. Examining 116 banks from 16 countries for the period July to December
1996, Lau and McInish (2003) identified that IMF bailouts had a positive impact on banks’ market
performance in bailed-out countries. Lee and Shin (2008) further confirm the existence of moral
hazard by using a dataset covering 18 emerging countries for the period 1998–2000.
To separate moral hazard from other factors that influence market spreads, alternative
approaches are employed to measure investor moral hazard instead of changes in bond spread.
For example, Haldane and Scheibe (2003) used the change in market valuation of creditor banks
as a proxy for moral hazard. They found that market valuation of UK banks is positively and
significantly associated with large-scale IMF loan packages, suggesting that investor moral haz-
ard does exist, which is consistent with the findings reported by Gai and Taylor (2004). It is
worth noting that Mumssen et al. (2013) examined the effects of short- and longer-term IMF
engagements and found that longer-term IMF support (at least five years of program engagement
per decade) assisted Low-Income Countries (LICs) maintain sustainable economic growth. In
L. Li et al. / Journal of Policy Modeling 37 (2015) 891–914 897
addition, short-term IMF engagement through augmentations of existing programs or emergency
facilities is associated with a wide range of positive macroeconomic outcomes within LICs.
However, the findings are far from conclusive, which is primarily due to the flaws in the
research methodologies used in these studies from our perspective. Dreher (2004) argues that
using dummies to capture change in the degree of moral hazard is not a suitable approach because
one of the key assumptions underpinning this approach is that the economic fundamentals of
recipient countries remain steady during the crisis period—which is simply not the case. In
addition, the economic fundamentals employed in the empirical analysis are exogenous because
their fluctuation largely depends on the availability of IMF funding. Third, the selection of event
window for IMF studies is not consistent and very subjective—ranging from a few days to several
years. Moreover, the empirical findings of short- and long-term studies are inconsistent. Therefore,
short- and long-term moral hazard needs to be further investigated. Fourth, it is worth noting that
various studies examine the moral hazard issue by investigating the relationship between IMF
bailouts and the political connections of bailed-out countries. In this regard, Barro and Lee (2005)
found that the IMF’s lending decisions are highly politically driven. Similarly, Lee and Shin (2008)
claim that moral hazard cannot be prevented by the IMF as long as the major shareholders of the
IMF, such as the US, are in favor of bailing out countries that are more politically connected.
In short, with respect to moral hazard, the empirical evidence is far from conclusive. The
mixed empirical findings are primarily due to methodological issues, such as the measure of
moral hazard, and the choice of events and event windows. However, Dreher (2004) concluded
that IMF bailouts do cause moral hazard among investors because the evidence from stock market
studies is consistently positive and significant. Mussa (2004) and Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2004)
pointed out that empirical research in to moral hazard is not meaningful because lowering the
borrowing costs of debtor countries is the expected consequence of an IMF bailout, and not proof
of moral hazard. Therefore, examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing
costs is not an effective strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. In addition, bailed-out
countries are expected to run more expansionary policies than countries that have not received
support from the IMF. From the perspective of avoiding moral hazard, what matters is whether
IMF interest rates are fair in the sense that they cover the risks faced by the IMF.
2.3.  Bailout  conditionality
The IMF provides financial assistance to countries only if they agree to implement a series of
economic policy reforms to revive and maintain a sustainable economic growth rate in the long
term. Debtor countries are normally reluctant to do so because they need to give up a certain level
of solvency autonomy in order to receive external financial support. Typical economic reforms
include devaluing currencies, lowering tariffs, encouraging foreign investment, privatizing state-
owned enterprises, and reducing expenditure on the public sector. It is fair to say that these policy
reforms are mainly free-market oriented.
Recently, the IMF was criticized for forcing recipient countries to take on policy reforms
without considering the difference in economic status, business environment and culture among
these countries. In addition, the tough austerity package attached to bailout funds has implications
for leadership at the highest level and forces governments in recipient countries to sacrifice policy
autonomy, cut public spending, increase tax and retrench staff, in order to return budgets to surplus
in the short term. Unfortunately, these policy reforms often lead to inactive business investment,
poorer government service, severe social instability and a higher unemployment rate—all of
which may damage the economic development of bailed-out countries in the long term. For
898 L. Li et al. / Journal of Policy Modeling 37 (2015) 891–914
example, the IMF has been criticized for being one of the major causes of the recent Ebola
outbreak in Africa, because its policy of prioritizing debt repayment over domestic spending
has weakened the public health infrastructure in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia who were
hit hardest by the epidemic. This had direct implications for the coordination of health services
across these countries, including a lack of effective communication coordination and information
management. Furthermore, the enforced policy reform is criticized for being a ‘one-size-fits-all’
approach that lacks flexibility, and fails to acknowledge the significance of context such as local
economic conditions, cultures and business environments in these countries.
Empirical research into conditionality normally investigates the effectiveness of IMF bailouts
from functionalist, structural and public choice perspectives (Steinwand & Stone, 2008). From a
functionalist perspective, conditionality is necessary because it forces debtor countries to adopt
prudent economic policies to achieve the desired effects of the IMF program. However, it is
observed that recipient governments may not be willing to follow the bailout conditions, and
the IMF may threaten to cut off aid if recipient governments fail to cooperate. Therefore, Scholl
(2009) argued, to achieve the desired bailout outcomes, self-enforcing conditional aid strongly
stimulates the economy of recipient countries. However, Dreher and Walter (2010) claimed that
the conditionality of IMF loans has no impact on the outcome of IMF intervention.
In determining how to rescue bailed-out countries, structural views represent the interests
of the IMF’s major shareholders particularly in the US. This approach suggests that political
connections play a critical role in fund allocation and conditionality. For example, Presbitero and
Zazzaro (2012) concluded that political similarity with G7 countries is positively correlated with
the probability of entering a loan agreement. In addition, the harsher the crisis and the exposure
of foreign banks in the country, the larger will be the size of the IMF bailout. Similarly, in their
investigation of 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992–2008 period, Dreher,
Sturm, and Vreel (2015) identified temporary membership on the United Nations (UN)Security
Council as representative of a country’s political importance. Specifically, that such country
receives softer treatment from the IMF when negotiating bailout conditions. In return, major IMF
shareholders, such as the US and major European countries, may exert more political influence
over the Security Council.
From a public choice perspective, conditionality serves the institutional self-interests of IMF
staff. For example, Dreher (2004) argues that the conditionality associated with IMF and World
Bank loans gradually increased and became inseparable. The major objective of conditionality
is to promote economic growth and reduce poverty yet bailed-out countries prefer to minimize
conditionality. However, in reality the IMF normally has a stronger bargaining position. Stone
(2008) reports that conditionality varies widely, and the IMF would like to maximize the scope
of conditionality when countries are most in need of it said. Even when the conditions attached
to IMF bailouts sound perfect, unfortunately their effects are often negative. Dreher and Vaubel
(2004) found that the number of conditions are negatively associated with international reserves
and positively associated with interest rates in the world capital market and monetary expansion in
the borrowing market. However, overall the effect of conditionality was not found to be significant
in their study.
Even if the conditions of an IMF loan are well designed, the effectiveness of their enforcement
may be problematic. Lack of effective enforcement of conditionality can be viewed as one of the
major reasons for the failure of bailouts, and may be attributed to the political pressure exerted by
major member countries. For example, Stone (2004) argued that the IMF never seriously punishes
countries that do not cooperate with bailout conditions if these countries are political allies of the
US. In a similar vein, Kilby (2009) found that it is difficult for the World Bank to impose strict
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structural adjustment conditionality on countries that are friendly with the US. Similar findings
are reported by Stone (2008) and Dreher, Jan-Egbert, and Vreel (2009).
Recently, performance-based aid was proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional con-
ditionality approach. This would entail the IMF or World Bank, instead of committing fixed
amounts of aid on a country-by-country basis, linking ‘the allocation and disbursement decision
by committing the aggregate amount to a group of countries, but where the actual amount dis-
bursed to each individual country depends on its relative performance’ (Svensson, 2003:384). The
fundamental objective of this approach would be to strategically improve the overall effectiveness
of the aid provided by international organizations. In addition, the IMF and World Bank could
choose when and which country to assist based on favorable economic conditions for a bailout.
Furthermore, competition among recipient countries might result in an overall improvement in the
conditions in terms of supporting an effective use of aid (Öhler, Nummenkamp, & Dreher, 2012).
This approach sounds idealin theory. However, empirical evidence of its effectiveness remains
limited. For example, Scholl (2009) claimed that self-enforcing conditional aid strongly stimu-
lates economic development by substantially increasing welfare in recipient countries. However,
assessing the effectiveness of self-enforcing conditional aid is costly, particularly in ensuring
enforceability of less benevolent political regimes which receive large aid funds in return for less
stringent conditions. Öhler et al. (2012) found that the incentive to cooperate among recipient
countries gradually weakens overtime when the timing and magnitude of aid are uncertain.
In short, the effectiveness of bailout conditionality is clear, and only 20% of loans were repaid
in full in the period 2005–2009, based on are port published by the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Öhler et al.,
2012). In addition, as mentioned above, conditionality has multiple objectives rather than being
purely economically driven. Vreeland (2006) and Dreher (2009) argued that IMF compliance is
not straightforward because IMF agreements span many dimensions, which vary from agreement
to agreement. Therefore, a new research methodology is required to clarify the issue. Furthermore,
the IMF has never comprehensively reported on the non-compliance of recipient governments.
Instead, it frequently waives its program obligations. Consequently, debtor countries have no
motivation to implement the predetermined economic reforms or fulfill the conditions of their
aid (Svensson, 2003). Thus, as Heckelman and Knack (2008) concluded, such aid may even slow
policy reform.
2.4.  Leadership  and  corporate  governance
Globalization creates opportunities or challenges for countries, depending on their economic
status. Leaders and policy-makers, through corporate governance, seek to adopt structures and
institutions that promote economic and social dynamism (Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009).
Leadership and corporate governance are intertwined in terms of their influence on accountability
and regulation. The knowledge that leaders possess and disseminate to their boards is viewed as a
key element in any country’s development and learning (Ellerman, 1999). This is due to the fact
that leadership extends beyond policy and is embedded in the engagement between the state and
its agencies, and in turn between the state and the population (Mayosi et al., 2012). Countries that
come to the rescue of less fortunate countries via the IMF often do not have a good understanding
of the recipient country’s status or the purpose of the IMF bailout package. In this regard, the
characteristics of leadership are specific to each country’s context and hence corporate gover-
nance policy, procedure and practice. While the leadership literature is extensive, the corporate
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governance literature is limited in terms of an understanding of the governance structures and
systems that enhance optimal organizational performance (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003).
To some extent, the role of corporate governance in financial markets is well documented
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, 2000). The
key objective of corporate governance is to provide good returns to investors on their financial
investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The legal protection of investor rights is considered to
be one of the key priorities within corporate governance, and countries with good corporate
governance systems usually provide better protection to investors (La Porta et al., 2000). Drawing
on financial crisis studies, Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) argue that poor corporate
governance had a significant effect on the extent of currency depreciation and stock market declines
during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Their findings indicate that countries with weak legal
protection of shareholder rights and poor enforcement are more susceptible to a fall in asset values
and a collapse of the exchange rate. The notion that a weak corporate governance system was
one of the major causes of the AFC is supported by Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett (2001). The
failures and weaknesses of corporate governance arrangements constitute one of the major causes
of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), as the existing corporate governance mechanisms
failed to safeguard investors’ interests against excessive risk-taking in a number of financial
services companies (Kirkpatrick, 2009). Financial firms with dominating shareholders performed
worse during the 2007–2008 financial crisis (Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2012), yet banks with
sound risk management structure performed better during this crisis (Aebi, Gabriele, & Schmid,
2012). In relation to the country-level studies, Li and Moosa (2015) claim that countries with
weak governance systems are more likely to be associated with greater operational losses in
terms of both frequency and severity. It is argued that corporate governance systems serve as an
effective enforcement tool for bailed-out countries to restore their economies and financial markets
after bailouts. Countries with leadership evidenced in good corporate governance systems are
more likely to recover from an economic crisis. In addition, IMF package recipient countries are
required to implement a series of economic reforms in exchange for external financial assistance.
The reforms attached to IMF packages normally include improving government efficiency and
accountability, combatting corruption and privatizing state-owned enterprises, which leads to
corporate governance reform. The dynamic change in the corporate governance system of recipient
countries inevitably plays an important role in the bailout process.
Empirical studies investigating the effect of corporate governance on the success of IMF
bailouts are limited. Only a few address one or two corporate governance variables, and seek to
identify the link between corporate governance variables and the outcome of bailouts, instead of
examining the overall impact of the corporate governance system. For example, Dreher (2006)
identifies that a lower level of democracy and political stability actually increases the probability
of a country requesting an IMF loan. In addition, he revealed that countries with an accountable
legal system have a better chance of receiving larger IMF loans, and a lower probability of program
suspension. Similarly, political instability is negatively associated with IMF loan approval and
loan size (Lee & Shin, 2008). Additionally, Jorra (2012) finds that a high level of parliamentary
democracy is negatively and significantly associated with the probability of sovereign default,
implying that the general openness of political institutions has a significant impact on the effect of
IMF bailouts. In contrast, Dreher and Gassebner (2012) found that countries with high levels of
democracy are more likely to experience major government crises because parties in such systems
can readily express their opinion on controversial policies and events, which may trigger a crisis.
Corruption is one of the major barriers to the effectiveness of external aid, and recipient countries’
incentive to fight corruption is a key factor driving the success of bailouts (Öhler et al., 2012).
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The importance of corporate governance to a country’s economic development is well doc-
umented in the literature. Therefore, we argue that the quality of corporate governance and the
improvement in corporate governance systems, in particular, play important roles in determining
the success of IMF bailouts. In addition, the implementation approach taken by the IMF needs to
be further investigated, such as key persons involved in designing and implementing IMF bailouts,
fund allocation channels, and the approach taken to combating corruption.
From the perspective of cultural theory, while the goals of the IMF and a recipient country may
be similar, their respective interpretations of these may differ. The IMF would do well to adopt
a cultural approach to management by seeking to understand each recipient country’s dominant
culture. This is referred to as an ‘ambicultural’ approach to leadership and management, and pro-
vides a model for bridging cultures and organizations so that they may interact more effectively
(Jer Chen & Miller, 2010). This model is increasingly having an influence on the mindset of IMF
leadership across the globe, and increasingly being put into practice, evidenced in the organiza-
tion’s greater consideration of the dominant values, attitudes and beliefs of recipient countries.
This is resulting in superior models of governance, leadership and administration between the
giving and recipient countries (Jer Chen & Miller, 2010), thus enhancing sustainable practices of
mentorship, support and ultimately independence for the recipient country.
2.5.  Financial  and  economic  engineering
To date, borrowed funds are being used by penniless nations to bail out other penniless nations.
The IMF obtains money from numerous nations that are in major debt themselves. To illustrate,
the five largest contributors to the IMF are the US (16.75%), Japan (6.23%), Germany (5.81%),
France (4.29%), and the UK (4.29%); yet it is well known that these countries are all experiencing
major financial economic issues themselves. For example, the US has a debt-to-GDP ratio of over
100%, and Japan is associated with a significant debt-to-GDP ratio of over 200%. Thus, it is
evident that these countries are funding the IMF with borrowed money. For decades, the IMF
used money as a way to force developing nations to do what it wanted them to do. However, prior
to 2009, this had mostly only been carried out among poor nations. But now an increasing number
of previously wealthy nations are turning to the IMF for assistance. For example, in recent years we
have seen Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus receiving bailouts that were partly funded by the
IMF with Spain receiving a bailout for its banking sector. So what happens when the contributors
run out of money and are no longer able to contribute? For how long can this situation continue
before the entire system collapses? We need to find new ways and approaches to fund IMF
bailouts.
As discussed above, doubt is cast on the efficiency and effectiveness of the IMF in managing
international financial crises. To date, the empirical results of IMF bailout studies cannot provide
conclusive findings on this issue. In addition, prominent economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and
Jeffrey Sachs have publicly questioned the appropriateness of both the problem diagnosis and the
assistance that programs provide, going so far as to charge the IMF with making the crises worse,
deeper and longer than might otherwise have been the case.
The debate surrounding reforming the international financial architecture has attracted the
media’s attention in recent years, particularly as previous financial rescue decisions have often been
rushed and made without careful or constructive design. One notable example of an alternative to
the bailout is the proposal for an international bankruptcy regime. Krueger (2001) claims that a
new treaty is required to provide some bankruptcy-style protection to sovereign debtors. Stiglitz
(2002) proposes the creation of a system similar to the Chapter 11 (US bankruptcy code 11)
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regime, to facilitate an across-the-board restructuring of private borrowers’ debts in the event
of macroeconomic shocks. Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995), Sachs (1998), Sachs, Radelet,
Cooper, and Bosworth (1998), and Fisher (1999) argued that the IMF requires placing enough
money on the table to ensure that it can stop capital flight from financially stressed countries.
Others have suggested new binding rules to substantially scale back the amount of funds the IMF
can provide to countries facing crises. The Meltzer Commission (also known as the International
Financial Institution Advisory Committee—IFIAC, 2000) suggests that the IMF should exit the
business of lending to countries that discover macroeconomic virtue only when they are close to
default. Instead it ought only to lend large sums to countries with good policies that qualify in
advance for extra protection—assuming that such policies could be defined. Lerrick, 2000 propose
that the IMF should support the secondary market for a country’s sovereign bonds rather than
lend directly to the country. However, to date, these calls for major reform have not significantly
changed the international financial system. We witnessed the IMF bailout failure in Greece, and
how its proposals failed to address the real underlying causes of the Greek crisis. Currently many
of the IMF solutions have been impractical or inappropriate in resolving financial crises as they
are unable to address essential factors such as culture and the economic and financial structures
that are often specific to each country.
To reiterate, IMF programs comprise three inseparable components – financing packages,
structural reforms and macroeconomic policies – within a single offer of assistance. In return
for IMF financial assistance, the bailed-out countries commit to the reforms known as structural
adjustment policies or programs (SAPs). These policies include, but are not limited to, increasing
exports, reducing domestic demand, placing constraints on government spending, and encourag-
ing privatization. Another broad view of SAPs describes the policies as involving a combination
of short-run measures aimed at stabilization, and long-run structural reforms aimed at transfor-
ming heavily controlled economies into market economies. For example, IMF support normally
includes privatizing industries and credit control, raising real interest rates, decreasing or ending
subsidization, lowering tariffs and increasing imports, tightening fiscal policy (at least initially),
opening up financial markets to foreigners, closing troubled banks and financial institutions, and
undertaking a range of other structural reforms.
However, we observe many unsuccessful IMF-supported programs (in Greece and Indonesia,
for example), where bailed-out countries have experienced severe capital outflows and currency
depreciations, even after the programs were implemented. Un-successful results are due to a
variety of factors, including the initial hesitation and policy reversals in program implementation.
Examples are premature rollbacks of monetary tightening, and political uncertainties that cast
doubt on prospective policies (as in the recent case of Greece). In addition, the overwhelming
imbalances between reserves and maturing short-term debt are major contributing factors to market
uncertainties over the IMF financing packages. Some bailed-out countries (such as Greece) have
experienced much deeper recessions than projected, reflected mainly in a collapse in domestic
spending, especially private investment. Greece underwent enormous current account adjustments,
associated mainly with sharp drops in imports.
Here we make an argument for alternative solutions based on financial and economic engi-
neering that address not only the country’s specific economic and financial structure but also its
aspects of culture. Some of these innovations, which we designate here as financial and economic
engineering, could lead to strong output growth generated by increasing private consumption,
exports and new private investment. Furthermore, cutting inefficient infrastructure projects and
public expenses, reforming the tax system and fighting corruption will all be critical to the success
of bailouts and economic reform.
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In addition, it is necessary for financially stressed countries to return their current accounts to
surplus by reducing unnecessary imports and boosting trade surpluses. Implementing appropriate
measures to increase international reserves will make a country less vulnerable to external shocks,
which will eventually enhance financial market confidence. By preserving social stability through
targeted subsidies, education and health programs, and employment creation, the risk of financial
stress can be reduced. Finally, we believe that, by implementing certain strategic structural reforms
such as closing down weak banks and other financial institutions, merging or restructuring debt,
improving loan recovery, easing foreign ownership restrictions, and establishing higher standards
of governance, such approaches to financial and economic engineering will assist a country such
as Greece to achieve economic and financial prosperity.
2.6.  Developing  a  bailout  model
Based on the bailout literature, the following theoretical model is presented which identifies
the connections among aspects of bailouts implemented by internationally recognized bodies and
organizations. A typical IMF bailout process can be subdivided into four key stages, which are
presented in Fig. 1. The first stage represents a situation of crisis around whether the government
of a financially troubled country should seek assistance from international official organizations,
and the potential outcomes associated with different decisions. The second stage is focused on
whether international official organizations, such as the IMF or World Bank, agree to provide
assistance after receiving a bailout request, and whether the country agrees to accept the rescue
package (funds and conditionality) offered. It is clear that the government of the troubled country
can reject the rescue package, as Malaysia did during the AFC. If two parties reach a deal,
then the third stage of the bailout process commences. This stage involves fund injection and
policy implementation imposed by the IMF or World Bank, which can be influenced by many
macroeconomic and financial factors that have a direct impact on the economic outcome of
bailouts. The fourth and final step in the process includes a review of the bailout.
Realistic questions to ask about bailout activities are concerned with whether a country is
willing to request assistance from the IMF/World Bank, and whether the IMF/World Bank agrees
to issue loans to the financially troubled country. The answer to the first question (Q1) is based
on an endogenous choice by the government, because the decision primarily depends on the
degree of that government’s resilience. In such cases, a government realizes that it needs to give
up a certain level of solvency autonomy in exchange for funding from the IMF or World Bank,
which inevitably leads to an uncomfortable government situation. If a government is confident in
being able to manage its problems alone, it will not seek assistance from international financial
organizations, and internally driven economic reform will be conducted instead. In contrast, it
can be expected that a government will request assistance from the IMF when all other options
are exhausted, implying that this government is nearing default in terms of its financial situation.
Once a country decides to seek assistance from the IMF, the first stage of the bailout process is
completed.
The second stage depends on whether the IMF or World Bank will choose to provide assistance
to the troubled country (Q2). The lending decision is complicated, and depends on the country’s
current financial and economic fundamentals, its political connection to these international orga-
nizations, how closely its economy is engaged with the rest of the world, and the depth of foreign
creditors involvement in the crisis (Barro & Lee, 2005; Lee & Shin, 2008). If the IMF or World
Bank decides to decline the request, the market will react negatively and immediately. However,
such an immediate rejection does not occur often due to the globalization of financial markets.
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Fig. 1. A typical IMF bailout process: a ‘spiral of doom’.
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What will most likely occur is that the IMF or World Bank will agree to rescue the country.
However, the conditions will be determined after a careful due diligence investigation of the
country’s economic and financial fundamentals is conducted. This will, automatically trigger a
negotiation process between the financial organization and the country. At this point, the country
must decide whether it should accept the rescue package, and the associated negotiation process
can be time consuming and tedious. A typical example is the case of Malaysia during the AFC. The
Malaysian Government rejected the assistance and advice provided by the IMF. Consequently,
it conducted a series of economic and financial reforms on its own initiative, such as tightening
capital control and devaluing the local currency. In addition, the Malaysian Government increased
government spending, in opposition to IMF policies. As a result of these measures, Malaysia suf-
fered less severe economic challenges than did other countries embroiled in the AFC (Billington,
2004).
More recently, the Greek Treasury bond yield is highly dependent on whether the IMF and
the ECB provide further financial assistance to the Greek Government. The re-elected Greek
Government has demanded a debt reduction, implying that Greece’s nation-state creditors must
write down and cover the investment losses by themselves. The EU and the ECB argue that treaties
and agreements made with previous Greek governments should be honored. The re-elected leaders
of the Greek Government argue that past agreements have only caused suffering and hardship
for the Greek people due to the tough austerity package attached to these previous treaties and
agreements. As expected, the market reacted negatively to the tension generated between Greece
and its euro zone partners during their debt negotiations, and the situation stirred up anxiety about
the solvency of Greek banks and fears that Greece might exit the euro zone bloc.
There is a unanimous agreement that Greece requires debt restructuring as it is impossible for
the Greek government to service its debt as the bailout is designed to fail (Manasse, 2015). It
is difficult to enter into re-negotiations with its creditors again without a convincing structural
reform plan in advance, which leads to a dilemma. A realistic solution could be that Greece deals
with an improved debt serving program specifically on lower borrowing cost, and longer terms of
maturities. Principal reduction can be avoided in order to maximize creditors’ interests (Taylor,
2015). The effect of this new plan may avoid new market uncertainties, and enable Greece to
pronounce a solution to its debt sustainability problem, which would eventually boost market
confidence and reverse capital flows as the country implements its structural adjustment debt
repay program overseen by an impartial body, such as IMF.
Alternatively, the solutions employed by the Malaysian Government during the AFC are wor-
thy of consideration. Major reform policies employed by the Malaysian Government included
devaluing the local currency, creating asset management companies, and tightening capital flow
to stimulate the economic growth. However, not all approaches are practicable for the Greek Gov-
ernment. For example, it is impossible for the Greek Government to devalue the Euro because the
monetary policies of ECB members are actually decided by ECB. If Greece adopts the Malaysian
solutions, then Greece’s exit from the Euro zone would be highly anticipated, leading to an
inevitable contagion effect. An alternative solution is for the IMF, EU, ECB or World Bank to
agree to issue a special rescue loan to Greece. In this scenario, the probability of default would
be reduced due to the liquidity injection from recognized international organizations (Lau &
McInish, 2003).
Once the international official organizations agree to issue special loans to a particular country
(the second stage), the third stage commences. The ultimate objectives of a bailout are to return
the public sector budget to surplus in the short term and maintain sustainable economic growth
in the long term. However, it has been widely observed that there are many factors that influence
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the bailout outcomes. For example, there is significant evidence in the literature on the impact
of bailout conditionality and moral hazard. As discussed above, the design and enforcement of
bailout conditionality mainly depend on the bailed-out country’s economic fundamentals, and its
political relationship to international official organizations and to the key members of the IMF.
However, the effects of bailout conditionality are generally disappointing due to the conflicts of
interest between international financial institutions and major member countries (Öhler et al.,
2012). On the one hand, countries can easily access the funds from international financial insti-
tutions if they are politically closely related to major member countries, and lax enforcement of
conditionality can be expected due to such political connections. Similarly, Stone (2004) finds
that countries that are politically important to the US receive lesser punishment if they do not
comply with IMF bailout conditions. In relation to moral hazard, the empirical findings of pre-
vious studies are inconsistent—mainly attributed to issues associated with research design and
methodology. Furthermore, the significance of the moral hazard phenomenon has been challenged.
Mussa (2004) and Jeanne and Zettlemeyer (2004) observed that bailed-out countries tend to have
lower borrowing costs and to adopt more aggressive economic policies after receiving financial
assistance from international financial organizations. To avoid moral hazard, it is important that
the loan interest rates reflect the underlying risks associated with those countries and the risk
faced by the IMF.
Traditionally more attention is paid to the relationship between bailout outcome and corpo-
rate governance and leadership quality. The literature shows that countries with good corporate
governance and leadership are more likely to maintain sustainable economic growth. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998) state that countries with
good legal and corporate governance systems provide better shareholder protection, which there-
fore leads to more valuable stock markets, larger numbers of listed securities per capita, and a
higher rate of initial public offerings than is the case in less protected countries. Moreover, La
Porta et al. (2000) claim that a good investor protection system may benefit the growth of the
real economy. In terms of financial bailout activities, the economic reforms to which bailed-out
countries must commit automatically trigger corporate governance reform, leading to an economic
and financial system with better efficiency, accountability and functions.
Financial engineering is another aspect of the financial support provided by international official
organizations. Problems related to financial engineering include: (1) how the organizations can
effectively collect the principal of bailout loans from bailed-out countries; and (2) how the financial
health of these organizations can be maintained. Empirical results show that, based on the OECD
record, the majority proportion of loans are never repaid. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the
design, implementation and enforcement of rescue loans in their current form are unsustainable.
Such rescue packages need to be fundamentally reconstructed. And as a consequence of the failure
of loan repayment, these organizations will likely be more cautious with their future lending
decisions, which will indirectly reduce the efficiency of the rescue process. In this regard, the
current situation facing Greece and its creditors is a typical example. This prolongs the decision-
making process and increases market uncertainty for investors. In addition, as mentioned above,
the major member countries of the IMF and World Bank are financially distressed. Thus the
financial stability of these international organizations is becoming increasingly uncertain.
The fourth and final stage of the bailout process is the performance review of the bailout based
on macroeconomics and financial market performance, and the loans repayment process of bailed-
out countries. If the desired economic performance is reached, then officially international official
organizations will cease further assistance, and the country will again be fully controlled by its own
government. However, as revealed in the above discussion, the overall effectiveness of bailouts
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is not promising, which triggers another question for these international official organizations,
around whether to rescue the country again even if it does not achieve the desired economic
outcomes.
It should be noted that the economic performance of bailed-out countries does not appear to
significantly influence the lending decisions of international financial institutions. On the one
hand, if these institutions reject a request for assistance, the markets in general react negatively in
the short term due to the increased economic and financial uncertainty surrounding the country.
However, such a response has been rare in recent years due to the integration of global financial
markets. On the other hand, the markets will react positively in the short term when international
financial institutions agree to provide financial assistance to such countries. However, as demon-
strated above, the effectiveness of bailouts in the long term is dubitable and thus these financially
troubled countries will be worse off either way.
2.7.  Alternative  ﬁnancial  engineering  solutions  to  bailouts
As claimed by the IMF, its bailout programs are aimed at tackling the root causes of a country’s
financial problems and restoring investor confidence, thereby strengthening financial systems,
improving governance and transparency, restoring economic competitiveness, and modernizing
the legal and regulatory environment. And these programs often do far more than address the
major fiscal, monetary and trading balances. More importantly, as a condition for the receipt of
IMF loans, recipient countries must comply with the strategies of the IMF which are based on two
key postulates: the need to reform economies, with a particular emphasis on fiscal discipline and
banking sector restructuring; and the requirement to maintain high interest rates to avoid capital
outflows and currency crises.
However, on numerous occasions we have observed that the high interest rates prescribed by
the IMF to limit currency depreciation have had severe repercussions for the economies of Asian
countries. For example, during the 1998 AFC, interest rate hikes were not effective in slowing
down currency depreciation, but rather worsened the extent of the crisis by leading to widespread
banking and corporate bankruptcies. In Indonesia the fiscal policy requirements included in the
IMF package proved to be unnecessary and even harmful; excessive fiscal discipline made the
crisis-induced recession worse.
The effects of these policies are described in terms of a vicious circle: the credit crunch imparted
severe financial losses to otherwise solvent companies; and the widespread fall in profitability
translated into higher levels of non-performing loans and credit risk, exacerbating the crisis-
induced recession, in turn, causing a further contraction in the supply of credit as commercial
banks needlessly sought to tighten credit conditions on new loans and limit business activity—all
of which deepened the crisis and destabilized the economies. In light of the above findings, it
is timely to propose a set of financial engineering solutions that may assist the management
of sovereign financial and economic crisis without the aid of the IMF. We outline a number of
financial engineering solutions below.
2.7.1.  Proposed  bank  liability  guarantee  scheme
The primary purpose of this scheme would be for the country to guarantee the liabilities of
banks, which would have an immediate effect of restoring confidence in banks and preventing
capital flights and liquidity crisis. This is a preferable solution to the IMF closing insolvent banks,
as it would assist stabilizing the banking system during a crisis period. However, one unfortunate
short-term consequence would be an increase in the sovereign debt burden.
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2.7.2.  Proposed  bank  recapitalizations  and  nationalizations
This provides an additional medium- to long-term solution to prevent bank solvency crisis.
Historically, many countries, such as the US and the UK, have used common shares, preferred
shares and other hybrid instruments such as convertible preference shares to restore bank solvency.
This approach could promote national economic growth as the credit market revives and stimulates
economic expansion through loans to various enterprises. However, a drawback of this strategy
would result in an increase of public debt.
2.7.3.  Establishment  of  an  asset  management  company
This would be a powerful solution to quickly ensure the financial stability of banks by either
removing the impaired assets to an asset management company or insuring against losses. The new
Asset Management Company could be created to buy up the nonperforming loans of commercial
banks at written-down values and then sell them off once the debts were recovered. The bad loan
bank would eventually need billions of dollars to buy up the loans, and this loan buying would
be financed by a mix of zero coupon bond issues with government guarantees and funds from the
private sector. This process of bond for loan exchange is the most efficient bailout solution because
it could stimulate economic growth much faster than other financial engineering solutions. This
process has the advantage of quickly stabilizing bank balance sheets and restoring confidence in
the banking system. However, the public debt would eventually be increased. A typical example
of this solution was seen in Malaysia’s reaction to the AFC. A down side of this approach is that
it could lead to overpayment to buy bad assets if the process were not managed adequately. Once
the economy was recovered, the bad assets would increase in value, making the debt repayment
much easier and thus maintaining orderly financial and banking sectors.
2.7.4. Proposed  liquidity  support  scheme
The aim of this scheme would be to improve market liquidity in public and private debt
securities, allowing banks to continue their lending activities which would stimulate economic
expansion and would help not only to lower and stabilize sovereign bond yields but also to finance
budgetary and debt repayment needs in the short term. Various instruments could be used such
as a Covered Bond Purchase Program, to be designated in buying eligible covered bonds from
banks in the primary and secondary markets. In addition, a Securities Market Program could be
established, which would allow for the purchase of eligible bonds issued by various governments
and public entities (secondary market) and private entities (primary and secondary markets).
Another instrument could be provided through Long-Term Refinancing Operations, which would
be long-term credit (up to three years) provided on the basis of collateral. Finally, Emergency
Liquidity Assistance could provide a credit line as emergency funds to banks unable to put up
acceptable collateral to various lenders for regular refinancing.
2.7.5. Bailout  program
This traditional solution could be solicited by asking the IMF and other international financial
institutions and organizations for loans to help finance a country’s budget deficit, debt repayments
and bank recapitalizations. However, bailouts are normally conditional on the implementation of
large austerity programs which may assist governments via budgetary support, and can indeed
avert sovereign debt defaults and insolvency, but prudent and fair negotiations must be undertaken
to ensure a successful outcome that leads to economic growth.
Austerity package soften delay economic growth, and engender social unrest and political
instability, as witnessed with the latest austerity measures imposed on Greece by the IMF, the
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ECB and the EU. It is clear that large budgetary adjustments implemented in a short time span
are not feasible and in fact can pose a serious risk to a country’s financial health.
2.7.6. Proposed  debt  restructuring  program  and  implementation
The primary objective of this solution would be to reduce the troubled country’s debt burden
through debt reduction and restructuring. It entails a process that allows a sovereign entity facing
cash flow problems and financial distress to reduce or renegotiate its delinquent debts in order to
improve or restore its liquidity. If a country’s liquid assets and available financing are insufficient
to meet or rollover its maturing obligations, this solution could restore market confidence. The
debt restructuring would typically involve the rescheduling of maturing obligations. Alternatively,
it might involve a reduction in the debt stock and the question of whether a sovereign country’s
debt is sustainable becomes more relevant when a significant amount of fund financing is sought.
In February 2012, Greece launched the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history, covering
Euro 205 billion in debt. Additionally, the Euro group of euro-zone finance ministers agreed to
provide rescue funding to Greece up to Euro 86 billion over the next three years since August
2015. Other sovereign debt restructurings have also recently taken place, including in Belize
(2007, 2013), Jamaica (2010, 2013), and St. Kitts and Nevis (2012). Debt restructurings have
often been too little and too late, thus failing to re-establish debt sustainability and market access
in a durable way. The debt restructuring process can be executed through the implementation of a
debt swap via the exchange of old bonds for new bonds, with favorable terms that allow for lower
interest rate and longer maturity, thereby allowing troubled economies to avoid defaulting in the
near future. Greece is currently engaging in this process again, in seeking to reduce its old debt
interest burden. In addition, the ‘haircut’, which provides a significant reduction in the face value
of an old debt, is another technique that may be implemented in debt restructuring. However,
convincing investors to accept the debt reduction can be challenging. Yet, unquestionably, this
process would reduce the debt burden where private investors rather than taxpayers or public
investors would experience losses.
2.7.7. The  need  for  structural  reforms  and  implementation
A reasonable approach to fighting the economic, financial and sovereign debt crisis can be
described as a combination of fiscal consolidation, financial sector stabilization, and profound
structural reform in the labor and product markets. Immediate action to strengthen government
finances and stabilize the financial system is necessary in the midst of any crisis, to avoid further
instability and contagion. The primary objective of this solution would be to address impediments
to the fundamental drivers of growth by unshackling labor, product and service markets to foster
job creation, investment and productivity. Moreover, this approach would enhance an economy’s
competitiveness, growth potential and adjustment capacity. There are many ways to establish
successful structures that create long and sustainable economic growth, job creation and reduce
social unrest. The seven key techniques are summarized below.
Technique  1:  Implement financial sector reforms with bank recapitalization, deleveraging,
prudential capital requirements, the reorganization and downsizing of the banking sector, bank
resolution regime, and the strengthening of banking regulations and supervision.
Technique 2:  Develop entitlement reforms aimed at curtailing entitlements and selected social
security benefits.
Technique  3:  Develop labor market reforms that reduce the minimum wage for a limited period
of time, and reform unemployment benefits in response to current economic conditions.
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Technique  4:  Operationalize pension reforms by increasing the state pension age progressively
and curtailing early retirement.
Technique  5:  Implement public administration reforms to modernize public administration
with the use of the latest technology to reduce inefficiency.
Technique 6:  Increase competition in the non-tradable sectors such as electricity, transportation,
and telecommunications, as well as sheltered sectors such as legal, medical and pharmacy.
Technique 7:  Initiate the privatization of government-owned enterprises.
These techniques will result in adjustments that address the root causes of fiscal crisis, and
increase competitiveness and growth; however, such a strategy will only yield positive results in
the long term.
2.7.8. Implementation  of  stronger  banking  supervision  and  risk  management
The primary goal of this solution would be to create a stronger banking risk management
framework to enhance supervision, improve depositor protection and minimize systemic risks.
Strict rules will help to prevent bank crises in the first place. And if banks do end up in difficulty,
a common framework may be established to manage the process, including a means to wind them
down in an orderly way. One of the key components would be to harmonize the deposit guarantee
system and establish a credit bureau for the management of potential nonperforming loans that
could lead to severe financial crisis. As a result of these initiatives, the occurrence and magnitude
of bank failures would be reduced, the protection of deposits would provide greater confidence
and stability, the country’s outstanding credit could be better managed via timely decisions, and
sovereign countries would be less exposed to bank bailout costs.
Stronger supervision would ensure effective enforcement of prudential requirements for banks,
requiring them to maintain sufficient capital reserves and liquidity. Sovereign country banks would
therefore be more solid, and their capacity to adequately manage risks linked to their activities
and to absorb losses would be strengthened.
It should be noted that the various financial engineering solutions outlined above should be
selected based on certain variables, such as the nature of the crisis, the country’s financial and
economic structure, the political situation and the state of the global economy. This study set out to
determine whether the IMF bailout process contributes to a recipient country’s financial recovery
and ongoing stability. Through an extensive high level review and analysis of the IMF literature,
which informed the development of our Spiral of Doom Model, the evidence indicates that the
IMF is no longer viable, and nor is it sustainable in today’s political, cultural and economic global
climate. This finding has significant implications for understanding how countries may develop
and implement various techniques and strategies to ensure their sound financial and economic
standing in the long term.
3.  Conclusion
This is the first study to provide a comprehensive review and analysis of research that addresses
IMF bailout programs and makes several noteworthy contributions to the IMF literature by pro-
viding a new understanding of the IMF bailout process. This study is thereby particularly valuable
to countries that are seeking techniques to stabilize and strengthen their financial standing. Little
previous research examines the cumulative elements influencing IMF bailouts. And our findings
indicate that the fragmented literature is far from conclusive on the subject of the effectiveness of
IMF bailouts. The mixed results of empirical studies in this area are primarily due to methodologi-
cal problems, choice of events and variables, and data availability. The design and conditionality
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of IMF programs vary from one country to another, and it is therefore difficult for researchers to
conduct convincing IMF comparison studies. The contribution of the present empirical study is
the consolidation of the literature in the development of our IMF ‘Spiral of Doom’ framework.
A second contribution of this study lies in our proposed techniques and strategies that a country
might implement in pursuit of financial and economic stability. The implementation of policy
reforms needs to be further investigated, such as the interplay between the key factors of moral
hazard, bailout conditionality, corporate governance, financial engineering, leadership and other
economic variables. Furthermore, leadership is identified as a key driver of governance, change
and innovation, and it is imperative to address the dignity of all citizens residing in IMF program
recipient countries.
We acknowledge that the recommendations identified in the “Alternative Financial Engineer-
ing Solutions to Bailouts” section require resources in terms of time and money. What requires
implementing immediately are quick, efficient, and cost effective solutions to enhance the stabil-
ity and confidence of domestically and internationally financial systems. Some may view these
implementations as highly challenging due to the complexity of global financial and economic
system thus they may assert that it is not timely to consider any “grand” reform or significant
revision in international or multilateral structures. Turning to the financial aspects, the Greek debt
crisis has yet to be resolved, as does the recent Syrian refugee crisis which has imposed further
financial burdens on many countries which already experience financial distresses. The finan-
cial cost of host countries accepting millions of refugees has yet to be determined. We have not
observed any constructive agreements or plans between European countries, including Greece,
on how to jointly deal with the Syrian refugee crisis, which would impose further financial burden
on Greece recovery.
Further research is required to enhance understanding of the effectiveness of the aid provided
by international official organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, in particular. Questions
that are worthy pursuing and investigating include: What is the optimal research methodology
for measuring the effectiveness of IMF/World Bank bailouts? What is the impact of corporate
governance on the success of bailouts? Are studies on moral hazard meaningful? What is the
optimal structure of bailout conditionality? How can the financial support required for bailouts
be secured in the long term? Future research would further the consolidation of the IMF literature
and in turn, potentially impact on bailout policy.
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